

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS		ACTION	
1	TO	INITIALS	CIRCULATE		
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<p>REMARKS</p> <p>Dr. Tordella:</p> <p>A few days ago, General Carter personally delivered to me some old correspondence pertaining to the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense, with instructions to study it for its applicability to NSA and to inform him of the results of my study.</p> <p>I have prepared my notes in three copies - one each for the Director, yourself, and my personal file -- and marked them Private and Confidential for obvious reasons.</p> <p>FROM</p> <p><i>G. P. Burke</i></p> <p>DATE</p> <p>14 Dec 65</p> <p>PHONE</p> <p>3783s</p>					

Secretary, Ex. Off. of Defense

BURKE, CONFIDENTIAL STUDY

(14)

FOR THE

DIRECTOR

DECEMBER 1965

~~LIMITED~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Private and Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

14 December 1965

General Carter:

Pursuant to your oral instructions, I have reviewed the correspondence pertaining to the functions of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense (inclosed at Annex A) and similar correspondence concerning the Executive Secretariat, Department of State (at Annex B). I have also consulted the Government Organization Manual for other pertinent background. My notes, relating this review to the needs of NSA, are inclosed herewith; they include recommendations for the establishment of an Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, National Security Agency.

In spite of the fact that I have borrowed generously from Secretary Lovett's letter to Secretary Wilson, the notions contained in the inclosure result not only from a review of the aforementioned documents but also from a daily mental perusal of the problem and the options for the last two months.

I have had the valuable opportunity to observe some of the deficiencies which continually confront the Director and the Deputy Director. It seems to me highly improbable that they will correct themselves; and it would appear, from the simple fact that most other departments and agencies of the Government have an executive secretariat or similar mechanism, that these deficiencies are not unique to NSA. So, as I see it, the need is clear and the Secretariat's general functions are obvious.

If one agrees to the need and to the functions, then the outstanding questions are composition and timing. With respect to the latter consideration, the present time seems propitious. The imminent move to the new building presents a practical opportunity to evade the laborious physical problems and inconveniences which attend any re-location of elements once

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they are settled, and the concomitant costs of such re-arrangements. Also, the final touches are about ready to be applied to the upper floors. The fact that your initial comments on a Secretariat were made several months ago is also pertinent -- a respectable time has transpired. Finally, I know of no other reasons to wait; the inevitable uneasiness of a few senior officials seems to have abated and they are by now more or less used to the idea.

We come then to the composition of the group. As you will see, I have recommended a complement of approximately twenty-nine personnel, a fairly modest figure according to the few rough comparisons I have been able to make. This total is almost equally divided between professional and secretarial/clerical/administrative personnel.

As to the source of the personnel, there would appear to be three basic options:

- (a) An existing organizational segment, augmented;
- (b) An existing organizational segment, with a high percentage of its present functions re-assigned to other existing elements;
- (c) A basically new element, with personnel individually selected from several major NSA organizations.

In one sense, options (a) or (b) may seem easier to accomplish and, therefore, more attractive at first glance. However, when one compares the less patent problems attendant each alternative, option (c) seems to me the far superior approach.

Take, for example, my branch, D324, which consists of twelve people -- eight professional and four clerical types. Even though he receives vital support from his subordinates, only one of the eight professionals -- the Branch Chief -- can be considered to devote the majority of his time in direct support

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(USIB) of the Director. Three devote most of their time to supporting -- with detailed and laborious staff work -- the NSA members of USIB Committees. Although their efforts support you indirectly, they are not of a nature which bear a personal affinity to your own responsibilities. For Bill Jenkins to provide CCPC support to Madison Mitchell from your office would be inappropriate. The other four professionals in D324 work on estimates. The association between estimates and USIB is, of course, a clear one. But, to be perfectly frank, the actual functions which these people perform are really PROD functions. The estimates responsibility was assigned to D324 to get it on the road, a measure of expediency which has worked. The relationship to USIB and USIB Committees, albeit real, was the justification for placing the function in D324 vice PROD. The point is that Miss Senger and her group are doing PROD's work, and they virtually live a good part of their day in PROD in order to do it. This work, and the extremely detailed efforts it requires, again does not bear the kind of intimate affinity to the Director which one envisions in terms of an Executive Secretariat. As a group, the professional people in D324 probably work longer and harder than any equivalent group in the Agency, just to keep up with their presently assigned functions.

If these people, as a group, were to be regarded as the nucleus of the Executive Secretariat, something would obviously have to give. Since the branch is working well and since USIB/USIB Committees/Estimates procedures are now established, an alternative would be to assign selected D324 personnel to new duties in the Secretariat, replacing them from other organizations. The branch, as such, would remain an integral part of D32. It is by circumstance that a few of the D324 professional personnel have the kinds of talents and personalities which make them entirely suitable for assignment to the Secretariat. I think particularly of Miss Senger, Mr. Bunting, and Mr. Jenkins. You should be aware that neither these three nor the other four - Messrs. Parry, Kim, Zoebelin, and Chadwick - have been in D3 very long. All of them came aboard subsequent to my assignment

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in August of last year. They are not typical D3 personnel; they are more dynamic and more aggressive. Quite honestly, D324 is considered uniquely atypical in D3.

I do not say this in disparagement of D3 personnel, who are, by and large, an unusually capable group of individuals. I say it because personality (not to be confused with winsomeness or extroversion) is important for Secretariat personnel. As you have said, one of the key methods of operation for the Secretariat will be to 'penetrate' the major line organizations in order that you can be kept properly advised. Many, if not most, of the D3 staff personnel simply do not have the personal characteristics which would enable them to insinuate themselves into the heart of the line operations. They are frequently excellent staff researchers but that is not, if my guess is correct, the type you want or need. To summarize this particular point, I do not believe that you would be able to take any single D3 group or element and come up with fifty percent of the people therein who would fit your needs, and that is a very liberal estimate.

Referring back to an earlier point -- the functional responsibilities of D3 elements -- again, I do not believe that 10% of the functions of any single element would bear a justifiable affinity to the Director's personal responsibilities: D31 - Contingency plans; D32 - 'deep' policy development and research; D33 - 3rd Parties; D34 - CCP. Although D32 functions come closer than the others, the large bulk of its professionals are engaged in research and staffing of the most laborious and time-consuming variety which, though extremely important and essential, does not permit them any freedom of action and which must continue to ^{be} performed someplace in the Agency.

All of which leads me to conclude that the Secretariat should be a new organization - not a transplanted one. And being new, it will not carry the stigma of any unfavorable reputation which could cause circumventing.

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The problem of collecting together some 14 selected professionals from the breadth of the entire Agency should certainly not be an insurmountable one. Admittedly, getting good people is never easy; the high-calibre GS-14/15 is probably the Agency's most precious commodity. But with the presently unequalled importance of the task at hand and the prestige of your office, the job of selection and assignment can, I feel, be done within a matter of a few weeks. Your firm backing, and Dr. Tordella's are, of course, the sine qua non.

As I have attempted to indicate in the inclosed recommendations, the most practical and effective approach would be to announce your decision now in general terms, then designate the Executive Secretary and let him work out the details. When this has been accomplished, promulgation of formal functional statements and official appointments can be effected. I have pointed out in the tabs to the recommendations that the term Director, as used in all correspondence on this subject, includes the Deputy Director in all respects.

Believing that you regard your oral instructions to me as private and confidential, I have neither confided nor consulted with other individuals in the preparation of these notes.

There are a number of notions which have occurred to me during recent weeks that have been omitted from these notes because of an inability to recapture them on paper in the last few days. There are also certain points contained in the notes which have been excessively belabored. In the interest of time, I have not tried to correct these deficiencies.


GERARD P. BURKE

Copy to: Dr. Tordella

Incls:
a/s

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THE NEED FOR AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

In NSA, an Executive Secretariat is needed to provide a service to the Director which is not now being performed rather than to improve an existing service.

The service needed is best described in terms of a few existing deficiencies:

The Director has no continuing assurance that actions in which he is, should, or must be involved are being taken properly, promptly, by the appropriate elements, in a coordinated manner, and that they are consistent with policy.

He has no assurance that he is being promptly and completely advised in or informed of those matters about which he should be cognizant.

There is no mechanism to protect him or his time from matters which do not merit his personal attention.

There is no instrument for conveying - simply, effectively, efficiently -- to the appropriate elements his wishes, instructions, or policies.

He has no mechanism to which he can confidently turn for relief from burdens for which, though generally routine in nature, he has a direct and personal interest, e.g., arrangements for important visits and visitors, certain correspondence requirements, etc.

He has no readily accessible group to which he can refer ad hoc and special actions, projects, and requirements, with the assurance that they will be levied upon the appropriate element or elements, with the necessary follow-up.

He has no one to keep him consistently abreast of the status of important internal developments.

The need for a Secretariat in NSA is not unlike the needs of other government agencies, although it may be greater. Not only does the Director of NSA direct a major industrial enterprise, but he also exercises controls over the vast resources of the entire U.S. cryptologic effort. In addition, he is a member of board of directors of the U.S. intelligence business; he is one of the government's senior intelligence officers; he has national responsibilities; he has departmental responsibilities; and he operates, in all these areas, within a framework of legal authorities which are imposing and unique. Moreover, he must conduct almost all of his business in a manner calculated to maintain the utmost security of the enterprise.

At the moment, NSA is one of the very few government organizations which do not have an executive secretariat. In addition to the term Executive Secretariat, nomenclature used to describe similar mechanisms includes: Office of the (Agency head) (e.g., Secretary of H.E.W.; Chairman, JCS; etc.), Secretary (e.g., AEC), Executive Office, Executive Assistant, etc. In some cases, several 'Special Assistants', or simply 'Assistants', constitute in the aggregate what in effect is otherwise an Office of or Secretariat for an agency head.

Although it would appear that most executive secretariats perform reasonably similar roles, i.e., coordinator/expediter/reviewer/monitor, their official descriptions vary considerably from the very bland and innocuous to the very forthright functional statement exemplified by the official characterization of State's Executive Secretariat:

"The Executive Secretary assures coordination of work presented to the offices of the Secretary, the Under Secretaries, and Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the implementation of decisions by these officials. In addition, he is responsible for the Operations Center."

The more discreet variety of functional statement would seem to be preferred for NSA.

The Character, Basic Functions, and General Concept of Operations
of the Executive Secretariat

From the fundamental premise that it is an "extension of the Director's own personality," can be derived two essential properties of the Executive Secretariat which are paramount and upon which depends the logical development of its functions and its make-up: loyalty and responsibility to the Director alone; and performance of only those duties which are in direct and personal support to the Director.

The Executive Secretariat, deriving its effectiveness and influence from the accepted recognition of its intimate association with the Director and from the realization throughout the Agency that it receives its direction only from and owes its loyalty only to the Director, must, as a general proposition, operate through suggestion and persuasion. Failure to achieve its objectives in this manner does not automatically vest in it any authority to direct or command on its own initiative or to invoke the name or position of the Director in an arbitrary manner. Its success is dependent upon competent performance and upon a demonstrable showing that its endeavors, while exclusively in the interest of the Director, are not made without significant benefit to the Assistant Directors and to the organization at large.

"Essentially [the Executive Secretariat] provides the final audit to insure completeness, accuracy, coordination, quality, and all other related factors, to insure that the [Director] takes appropriate action when, as, and if required -- and equally important, to provide that final review designed to protect the [Director] from ill-considered or unilateral actions. These . . . functions are almost entirely in the interest of the [Director] alone, to protect him against low standards, unsuspected departures from policy, inaction, disjointed action, delayed action, and precipitous action."

Briefly, the Executive Secretariat maintains its competency to function - its knowledgeability and awareness - by a continuous review of communications (correspondence, messages, reports, etc.) going to and from the Agency and by its daily informal

liaison with Agency elements. It selects for the Director's personal attention that information which he must or should read or be aware of. Matters on which the Executive Secretariat is required to act receive its special scrutiny, e.g., correspondence to the Director, correspondence submitted for the Director's signature, actions requiring the Director's decision or approval, meetings or conferences to be attended by the Director, etc. In almost every case, it works with the responsible action offices or officers, as early as possible in the development of the action, to insure that proper coordination will be or is being carried out, that policy aspects are being fully considered, and that the plan or program for accomplishing the desired objective is sound and is consistent with established or desired deadlines. It conveys, when appropriate, the Director's opinions and desires relating to the developing action, seeking his advice and guidance when required. It keeps the Director informed of the status of pending actions and of other matters in which he has directed that action be taken or has otherwise expressed a personal interest; to insure its ability to accomplish this, it maintains its own 'status' records, charts, etc. Professional personnel of the Secretariat assist the Director in the preparation of agenda meetings he is to attend and are present on certain occasions, e.g., weekly staff meetings, as recorders, assistants, etc. When appropriate, it acts in an advisory capacity to the Director.

The Executive Secretariat is an action office only when the matter is personal to the Director. It has no recurring functions other than those indicated, all of which deal exclusively with the provision of direct support to the Director. The Executive Secretariat should not assume functions which are being or can be adequately performed elsewhere in the organization. Such functions would inhibit the discharge of its primary personal responsibilities to the Director. They would tend to encumber the Director with additional problems rather than permit the Executive Secretariat to relieve the Director of routine problems, details, and worries. They would detract from the pre-eminent position of the Director, would cause the Executive Secretariat to become regarded as

just 'one more staff,' and would place it in competition with other organizational elements.

The key operating characteristics of the Secretariat are flexibility and mobility. Its professional personnel spend a considerable amount of time in the operating elements of the Agency.

~~SECRET~~Organization

Of the several organizational possibilities which present themselves, the best approach would appear to one which takes account of the two principal categories of the Director's responsibilities -- internal and external. Thus, the basic division of labor should be based on functions which look inward and downward, and those which look outward, across and upward.

The 'inward-looking' segment of the Executive Secretariat could follow to some extent the Agency organization. Directed by an 'Assistant Executive Secretary for Review,' it would include: one SIGINT staff officer (concerned mainly with P and D3 matters); one officer monitoring R/D matters; one officer responsible for CSEC and TCOM matters; one for personnel, security, logistics, fiscal, organizational, and training matters; and one for current intelligence. This latter billet would supply the requirement for assuring that the Director is properly informed on all-source intelligence, and the incumbent would concern himself with activities involving, for example, the Command Center, the Watch Report, national estimates, etc. The billet would have a special value with respect to the Director's need to stay on top of the war in Southeast Asia. Finally, a carefully-selected junior-level professional would be assigned to this element as a utility man, assisting the Assistant Executive Secretary for Review in filling gaps caused by absences, flaps, etc.; this would bring the total complement of the Review group to seven professional personnel. There would be certain interests common to all members of this element, e.g., CCP. In addition, there would be a number of subjects which would cross assigned areas of responsibility, e.g., overhead reconnaissance. In such cases, the individual with the predominant interest or with the most suitable background would be specifically charged with the primary responsibility.

Comprising the 'outward-looking' segment would be an Assistant Executive Secretary for External Activities and two other professional personnel. The latter would divide responsibilities for monitoring matters dealing with, inter alia: USIB; USCSB; PFIAB; OSD; DCI, DDCI/NIPE, and other DDCI's;

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2nd and 3rd Parties; visits to or by the Director; NSA activities involving high-level outside personnel, e.g., briefings; SCA Chiefs; and Agency public information activities. Any apparent disparity between this imposing list of responsibilities and the modest manpower devoted to them becomes less alarming when one considers that assistance will be available from the Review element and that the Executive Secretary himself will follow these subjects very closely.

The rest of the Secretariat needs little description. It would include, of course, the Executive Secretary and a Deputy Executive Secretary. In addition there would be an Assistant Executive Secretary for Correspondence and Internal Administration. His functions would include correspondence receipt and distribution; document control; internal security and clearances; internal personnel and administrative matters; and similar functions. In any Executive Secretariat, these otherwise routine functions are of special importance. It is estimated that eight administrative/clerical personnel, in addition to the head of the group, would be required.

A final element of the Executive Secretariat is optional but recommended, viz., an Assistant Executive Secretary for Special Projects. This is a one-man job which would be created for the sole purpose of performing special ad hoc tasks as directed by the Director or Executive Secretary. The incumbent would necessarily require a broad agency background and would have a special talent for analyzing particularly intricate problems, e.g., quasi-legal problems affecting the authority of the Director.

With secretarial personnel not mentioned above, the total strength of the Secretariat would be twenty-nine.

The attached chart depicts this organizational approach. If this organization were approved, a chart in less detail would be more appropriate for publication.


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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Executive Secretary *Deputy Executive Secretary*

Secretary



PERSONNEL

The personnel - professional, administrative, and clerical - must be the best. Too much is at stake to accept less; the opportunities for the Director to personally accomplish his own highly important objectives depend to a considerable degree on his freedom of action (which requires time) and on the efficiency of the direct support, both of which are provided by the Secretariat. Therefore, the personnel must be individually selected, not arbitrarily assigned because of 'availability' or because they happen to be part of a particular organization. Although quality personnel always seem to be in short supply throughout the Agency, there are few jobs which will be as important as those in the Secretariat, particularly in the beginning. The concept that it is an "extension of the Director's personality" is, of itself, a sufficient basis for this contention.

That the personnel selected will be professionally expert is a foregone conclusion, as is the presumption that they have the capacity for total loyalty. The more difficult requirement is the individual's "non-professional" qualifications. Aside from the moral virtues, discretion vies with judgment as the foremost personal attribute. A very close second is 'personality.' This is to be the first Secretariat; in two or three years, these special requirements will not be perhaps quite so critical. As of now, they are imperative. These are the people who must, in all their dealings, strike the delicate balance between prudence and tenacity, who must achieve their objectives without compromising, but without irritating. An individual who cannot grasp the sensitivity of the position has no place in the Secretariat.

This kind of person does not come cheaply. The first reaction comes from the supervisor who contends that his operation will fall apart if Mr. X or Miss Y is taken from him. The next comes from the person himself who says or at least thinks, "If I'm this good, I'm underpaid." Thus, assignment to the Secretariat must be attractive to the individual and provide him with personal incentive.

Neither individually nor collectively should these personnel represent 'competition' to regular organizational elements or officials. In terms of grade and stature, they should be neither too senior nor too junior. A too senior person can constitute a threat to the established bureaucracy and, hence, will soon be by-passed or 'cut-out of the traffic pattern.' A too junior person will be ignored and relegated rapidly by the bureaucracy to an exclusively administrative role. Given a reputation for competency, honesty, and objectivity, the medium-level person can be found acceptable and can effectively elicit the cooperation he needs.

The less 'conscious' the senior official is of potential competition from the Executive Secretariat, the less fearful he becomes for his own interests and prerogatives. With the right people in the beginning, the Executive Secretariat can achieve a stable relationship with the other elements of the organization and can become an accepted institution in a relatively short time.

SPACE AND OTHER PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS

Proximity to the Director's Office is the prime requirement.

An inspection of Annex 1 and a review of existing floor plans suggests three likely areas.

The first is an office/outer-office adjacent to the Deputy Director's Office and to the Director's/Deputy Director's outer office. This was originally intended to be the former Special Assistant's area; it is understood to be 'unclaimed' at the moment. It was slated to accomodate two or three people. It could probably handle four. Access to the area by the Director/Deputy Director can be accomplished without leaving the confines of the Directorate suite. Overcrowding should probably be avoided here for obvious reasons.

Immediately below this area, on the 8th floor, is a space now designated for D51. It could accomodate about twenty-four desks and a number of file cabinets. From the 9th floor, it is reached by a stairwell immediately opposite the door of the Special Assistant's outer office. The stairwell door on the 8th floor faces the entrance to this area.

On the 9th floor, adjacent to the Director's private Conference Room, there is an area now designated for occupancy by the Comptroller and his immediate staff. With some re-adjustment of the moveable partitions, this D5 area could also house about 24 desks plus file cabinets. Access to this space from the Directorate is through a short corridor which is outside the Director's suite but inside the fire doors which inclose the general area.

Since at least some segment of the Secretariat should be in the immediate vicinity of the Director's Office, the alternatives would seem to be:

- a. The Special Assistant's Office plus the D5 area on the 9th floor;
- b. The Special Assistant's Office plus the D51 area on the 8th floor;
- c. The D5 area on the 9th floor only (this would probably require a reduction in the number of personnel recommended for the Secretariat).

Occupancy of the Special Assistant's area by the Executive Secretary, one other professional member of the Executive Secretariat, and two clerical personnel would obviously lend a great deal of prestige to the organization, with attendant tangible, practical benefits. As a matter of interest, the Executive Secretary at the State Department occupies the office adjacent to Mr. Ball.

Any reliable estimate of the required number of typewriters, file cabinets, safes, and telephones, and any description of special security requirements must await approval of the proposed organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that

1. The Director approve the foregoing concepts in principle, and that:

2. He set a general time frame for the establishment of the Executive Secretariat, to follow as closely as practicable the occupancy of Annex 1. A suggested date, considering that things will move slowly during the holidays, is 31 January 1966.

3. He announce the decision within the next few days. The announcement at this time would: (a) enable the contractors to make final adjustments, e.g., positioning of movable partitions, installation of telephone and typewriter jackboxes, etc.; (b) give COSG sufficient time to make final decisions on the location of organizational elements affected; (c) provide adequate time for the selection and assignment of personnel to the Secretariat and the replacement of these personnel in their parent organizations; and (d) allow for the finalization of functional responsibilities of the Secretariat.

4. He promulgate a general functional/organizational description of the Secretariat, along the lines of the general concepts set forth above (see TAB A).

5. He designate the Executive Secretary, directing him to work with Assistant Directors and other senior officials to finalize details and empowering him to approve or disapprove personnel nominated by the major elements, other than the Deputy and Assistant Executive Secretaries. Appointment of the replacement for the billet now occupied by the Executive Secretary-designate should also be made now, in order to free the latter to begin his new tasks immediately (see TAB B).

6. He withhold promulgation of the formal statement of the Secretariat's responsibilities to coincide with its official establishment.

Memoranda required to effect the foregoing recommendations are contained at TABS A and B.

D R A F T

TAB A

TO: DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director

1. It is my intention to establish an Executive Secretariat as soon as practicable following initial occupancy of Annex 1.

2. In general, the Executive Secretariat will be assigned responsibilities involving: the supervision of administrative procedures and activities within the Office of the Director; the review of all communications submitted for the Director's consideration to assure adequacy of staff action; the monitoring of all actions of interest to the Director to assure that they receive proper coordination and prompt disposition; the coordination of all external activities of the Agency which involve the Director or top level outside officials; the authentication of certain routine matters for the Director; and the performance of other duties as directed.

2. The Executive Secretariat operates under the direct supervision and guidance of the Director, reporting to him only. Representing an extension of the Director's own personality, it exists solely to assist him in the discharge of his own

*page 2 of tab
marked "TAB A"
following recommendations*

responsibilities. As an additional Agency organization element performing duties not presently assigned to existing elements, it shall not assume any responsibilities now within the purview of such elements.

3. Initially, the Executive Secretariat shall consist of an Executive Secretary; a Deputy Executive Secretary; an Assistant Executive Secretary for Review and six staff officers; an Assistant Executive Secretary for External Activities and two staff officers; an Assistant Executive Secretary for Correspondence and Internal Administration and eight administrative/clerical personnel; an Assistant Executive Secretary for Special Projects; and an appropriate number of other secretarial/clerical personnel. It is expected that the initial total complement of the Executive Secretariat will be approximately twenty-nine personnel. These personnel shall be selected from the major NSA organizations.

4. Service in the Executive Secretariat must be performed by individuals of the highest professional calibre, whose loyalty, selflessness, and ability to work under continuing pressures is unquestioned. Therefore, Assistant Directors and other senior officials will exercise the greatest care and

selectivity in nominating these personnel. Assignment to the Executive Secretariat for professional personnel shall be for a period of approximately two years and successful performance during this period shall receive appropriate weight in their further development and future career opportunities.

5. Appointment of the Executive Secretary, the Deputy Executive Secretary, and the Assistant Executive Secretaries, and formal promulgation of the Secretariat's official functions and the effective date of establishment shall be made by separate memoranda at a later date.

6. The term Director in the foregoing paragraphs and in subsequent memoranda on this subject includes the Deputy Director of the National Security Agency in all respects.

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

DISTRIBUTION:

Assistant Directors
Commandant, NCS
IG
Chief, TCOM
COSG
Chiefs, NSA Field Activities
SUSLOs

D R A F T

TAB B

TO: DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Designation of Executive Secretary

Reference: (TAB A Memorandum)

1. Effective this date, _____ is designated Executive Secretary, Office of the Director and is relieved of his present duties. (Replacement) is appointed Acting _____ and will immediately assume (the _____ Executive Secretary-Designate's) duties.

2. Pending formal establishment of the Executive Secretariat, (the Executive Secretary-Designate) is directed to take all actions necessary to assure that the Executive Secretariat commences operations as soon as practicable following initial occupancy of Annex 1, in accordance with my general instructions in the reference. In addition, he is directed to convey to appropriate senior officials my additional instructions pertaining to the assignment of personnel to the Executive Secretariat, including the designation of specific organizational elements providing these personnel, and to the allocation of requisite space and equipment.

3. Mr. _____'s appointment shall be confirmed by subsequent personnel action memorandum.

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

DISTRIBUTION:

Assistant Directors
Commandant, NCS
IG
Chief, TCOM
COSG
Chiefs, NSA Field Activities
SUSLOs

Annex A /

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEC 23 1952

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In turning over the responsibilities of Secretary of Defense, I think it advisable to single out the Executive Office of The Secretary for special mention because of its present status as the direct extension of the Secretary's own personality. While other offices are generally understood and accepted on the basis of their responsibilities, the Executive Office is susceptible to misinterpretation because it actually has been given wider authority than can be openly stated in its charter.

When General Marshall and I were in the State Department, there were some 19 different offices reporting directly to the Secretary. Coordination between these offices on matters of mutual interest was haphazard, and in some cases studiously avoided. Immediate action was taken by the General to establish a permanent executive office to perform the functions to be subsequently outlined. This executive office has since become institutionalized there and in many other agencies.

Substantially the same situation existed in the Department of Defense in September 1950, when General Marshall and I assumed office. Accordingly, we established an Executive Office here in Defense. Over the past two years we have gradually developed clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility for that office.

As I mentioned above, the Executive Office is an essential extension of the Secretary's own personality. (The Deputy Secretary is included in the term Secretary), and the duties assigned to it stem from the dual concept of a "Secretariat" operation and a "Chief of Staff" operation.

The Secretariat functions of the Executive Office primarily represent well-understood and essential services to both the Secretary and the entire staff, and accordingly are not normally subject to criticism or misapprehension. On the other hand, the "Chief of Staff"

functions are subject to easy misinterpretation. Essentially, it provides the final audit to insure completeness, accuracy, coordination, quality, and all other related factors, to insure that the Secretary takes appropriate action when, as, and if required -- and equally important, to provide that final review designed to protect the Secretary from ill-considered or unilateral actions. These "Chief of Staff" functions are almost entirely in the interest of the Secretary alone, to protect him against low standards, unsuspected departures from policy, inaction, disjointed action, delayed action, and precipitous action.

Obviously then, the role of the Executive Office in performing its "Chief of Staff" functions is an extremely delicate one. It must be the intimate and personal staff agency of the Secretary, receiving direction and guidance only from the Secretary and having its responsibility and loyalty only to the Secretary. Since there actually is no top level senior Chief of Staff in the Office of the Secretary, the Executive Office, in approximating this function, must derive its effectiveness and influence from the certain knowledge of the entire Department of Defense staff that it is, in fact, an extension of the Secretary's own personality and operates with his full knowledge and support.

The manner of performing this 'Chief of Staff' function has always been with a light touch. When an action has reached the Secretary's level of consideration and is not thoroughly and completely buttoned-up, then the Executive Office first suggests to the action agency such additional further action as may be required in order to present to the Secretary a completed staff action of proper quality. If suggestion and persuasion prove unsuccessful in producing the required changes, then the Executive Office presents a choice of alternate solutions to the Secretary for his final selection. In other words, it does not operate in an arbitrary, authoritarian manner. In spite of its best efforts, and perhaps understandably so, the Executive Office generates occasional discomfort within the OSD staff, resulting in attempts to restrict its activities to purely administrative services. If the Secretary were always presented with completed, comprehensive, thoroughly thought-out and coordinated actions of high quality, then some consideration might be given these attempts. Unfortunately, my own experience in government has indicated otherwise and has proved conclusively the critical need for the "Chief of Staff" function as presently exercised by the Executive Office.

Finally, it is apparent that service in the Executive Office requires selection of the highest type of individuals, whose loyalty, selflessness, ability to work under extreme pressures, and whose possession of confidence and support of the Secretary, must be unquestioned. This in turn makes it essential, and incumbent upon the Secretary, to insure that appropriately attractive civil service positions and military grades are made available to the Executive Office, in numbers sufficient to perform both the Secretariat and the "Chief of Staff" functions, and that incentives of promotion and prestige are continually stressed, in order to attract, and retain, the high caliber of dedicated people required to perform these final audit and protective services.


Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable

The Secretary of Defense

RALovett/va

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



*Military Aides and Assistants not shown

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

31 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMEN OF BOARDS, COMMITTEES AND
COUNCILS, OSD
THE ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTORS OF OFFICES, OSD

SUBJECT: Functions of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the following functions are assigned to the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense, effective this date:

1. Establishes and supervises internal administrative procedures and activities within the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Reviews communications submitted for consideration by the Secretary of Defense to assure completeness of staff action, including adequacy of coordination and consistency with policy; and authenticates routine communications "for the Secretary of Defense".
3. Provides Secretary of, and secretariat services for, the Armed Forces Policy Council, Secretary of Defense Staff Council, Deputy Secretary of Defense Advisory Council, Joint Secretaries, and such other Councils, Committees and Conferences as the Secretary of Defense may direct.
4. Provides for the receipt, processing, and dispatch of correspondence for the Secretary of Defense and certain designated elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and provides similar service to other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon request.
5. Maintains the official office of record for communications signed by or for the Secretary of Defense, and for communications of

certain designated elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and provides similar service for other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon request.

6. Provides for the receipt, processing, and dispatch of cables for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, except for certain designated statutory agencies.

7. Reviews, issues, and maintains the official record of, the basic overall policies and directives of the Department of Defense.

8. Prepares and issues periodic reviews of selected policies and decisions of the Secretary of Defense for the information, guidance and assistance of the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

9. Maintains historical records and prepares historical reports for the Secretary of Defense; coordinates historical activities within the Department of Defense, as required.

10. Performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

In the foregoing assignment of functions the term Secretary of Defense includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense in all respects. Memorandum of 15 March 1951, subject: "Functions and duties of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense", and other memoranda in conflict herewith are rescinded.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert H. Taft", with a horizontal line extending from the end of the signature.

Secretary of Defense

Annex B

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Secretary of State

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT.- The Executive Secretary of the Department of State assures coordination of work presented to the offices of the Secretary, the Under Secretaries, and Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the implementation of decisions by these officials. In addition, he is responsible for the Operations Center.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

In 1790 Thomas Jefferson and five clerks administered the entire Department of State. Today Secretary of State Rusk and his three principal deputies for policy matters, along with the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, furnish the executive leadership of the Department—the function once performed by Mr. Jefferson alone. But Jefferson's five clerks have grown into a body of close to 7,000 employees in the United States.

In further contrast to 1790, the major policy problems faced by the Secretary and his deputies in the 1960's are not simple and they rarely permit leisurely contemplation of solutions. The effective management of State Department work on these problems has developed from a relatively simple function in Jefferson's day into a large and complex business. Today this management function for the top officials of the Department is the responsibility of the Executive Secretariat, a staff of close to 100 persons, headed by the Executive Secretary of the Department, William H. Brubeck.

The Executive Secretary and his staff do not make policy; that is the responsibility of the principal officers and operating bureaus of the Department. Instead, they help the Secretary and his deputies by making certain that all urgent business is given prompt attention, by insuring coordination between the various bureaus of the Department and other Federal agencies, by seeing to it that the Department reacts quickly and effectively to instructions of the President—in other words, by acting as a sort of traffic controller to see that the major work of the Department is sped along as smoothly and expeditiously as possible.

A recent innovation in the Secretariat has streamlined the Department for fast action. This innovation is the Operations Center, first established in 1961. It is a round-the-clock office which provides a mechanism for dealing with crisis problems and for keeping interested officers alerted to important developments in all parts of the world.

Imagine that you are admitted through a locked door marked "Operations Center" on the seventh floor of the Department of State. You find yourself in a long room lined on one side with glassed-in areas marked with the names

of current or potential international trouble spots. In one of them, labeled "Berlin," people are assembling documents for use at an upcoming meeting of the interagency Berlin Task Force. In another, a visual aids officer is preparing slides to support a secret briefing session in an adjacent conference room.

At the end of the long room sits the senior watch officer talking on a phone to the White House Situation Room. At a desk alongside, one of his deputies is studying a message just received from the Defense Department. A third member of the watch is deciding the distribution of a number of telegrams which have just come in from Foreign Service posts and have been sent up by pneumatic tube from the code room on the floor below.

On one wall is a map display panel with clipboards underneath marked with the names of each principal "trouble spot." The clipboards are related to the maps on the display panel and are filled with the past 24-hour "take" of important telegrams about the area whose name they bear. An officer from the Policy Planning Council is thumbing through papers on a clipboard marked "Sino-Indian Dispute" and studying the accompanying map defining the areas under dispute.

In another room, opposite the glassed-in areas, an officer of the Bureau of European Affairs is talking on a "scrambled" phone circuit to a post in Europe.

is the State Department's

Operations Center under normal workday conditions. At nighttime, under similar conditions, the scene is very much the same, with fewer people.

Now picture a scene of organized bedlam: four phones ringing at once on the desks of the watch officers at the end of the long room as colors flash on a console; two people in a corner proofreading a statement in loud voices; in a side area a secretary taking dictation from a harassed officer; a clerk turning out facsimile copies of an urgent intelligence report; people milling about in seeming confusion with bits of paper in their hands. This is the Operations Center at a time of crisis.

The public image of the Operations Center has tended to be that of a "crisis center," rather than an everyday organization designed to help lubricate the normal activities of the Department. Actually it is both, and something else besides. Since the operations of the Department are on a 24-hour-day, 7-day-week basis and cannot stop when its regular staff goes home to bed, the Operations Center provides the necessary continuity of operations in off-duty hours.

The Department's regular Operations Center staff numbers about 35. This includes the watch officers, a clerk for each watch, a telegraph unit, a visual aids officer, the director and his deputy.

The basic function of the Center can be summed up in the military phrase "command and control,"

which means essentially the process of gathering and using information and of expediting the process of making and executing decisions.

The Operations Center watch officers are responsible for monitoring telegrams from abroad, maintaining telephone contact as necessary with posts abroad, and giving fast alerts to officers of the Department at any time of the day or night.

To strengthen their close liaison with the State Department, both the Defense Department and the intelligence community assign officers to the Operations Center. During the rapidly moving Cuban crisis last fall, three members of the Operations Center staff in turn worked in the War Room of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to speed the flow of information between the State and Defense Departments.

Even in normal times, however, close and continuing contacts are maintained between the key agencies. Each oncoming watch in the Operations Center, for example, calls its counterparts at the White House, the Defense Department, and CIA to identify matters of common interest and thus encourage selective alerting on information bearing on these matters.

In the past year, the Operations Center has proved its usefulness during critical hours in Cuba, Laos, Berlin, the Congo, and elsewhere. As technology progresses and experience accumulates, the Center is expected to continue to develop and to improve its capacity for expediting today's global diplomacy.



AT THE WATCH OFFICERS' DESK--Lt. Col. Edsel Hart, USA (right foreground) talks over the "hot line" to the National Military Command Center. Seated at the telephone console, are Douglas Coster

(left) and Robert Williams (right), Senior Watch Officers. Standing at left is Philip Axelrod, Deputy Director of the Center, while Ralph Cadeaux alerts a desk officer to an urgent communication.

Operations Center--Locus of "Crisis Management"

By WILLIAM B. CONNETT, JR.

THREE years have now elapsed since the Operations Center was first established as a locus for "crisis management" in the State Department. Many changes have taken place since that time in the organization, functions and facilities of the Center. This evolutionary process--largely the result of adjustments to concepts new to the Department of State--has now reached the point where the Operations Center has settled into a fairly definitive mold. Doubtless it will evolve further as time goes on, but the initial "shake-down" period is over, and the time seems opportune to set forth its organization and functions for the benefit of News Letter readers.

Once attached directly to the office of the Secretary, the Operations Center now functions as a part of the Department's Executive Secretariat, with its Director serving as a deputy to the Executive Secretary, Benjamin H. Read. Hence it is clearly identified with the central staff function of managing the information flow to the Department's top policymakers. In discharging this function, the Operations Center is primarily concerned with the more urgent

categories of information, principally those received by telegram or telephone.

Like the Secretariat to which it belongs, the Operations Center is a service type organization. It does not make policy. Rather it provides a mechanism for supporting the policymakers, particularly in situations where quick responses are required.

While the Operations Center is closely integrated into the total Secretariat complex, its basic orientation differs somewhat from that of other parts of the Secretariat.

The traditional role of the Secretariat centers around assuring that the resources of the bureaus are marshaled in such a way as to be fully responsive to the needs and wishes of the Secretary and the Under Secretaries and of the White House. The Operations Center, on the other hand, is less concerned with relations between the bureaus and the "command echelon" than it is with providing specialized services to both. This distinction is well illustrated by the circumstance that the Operations Center deals largely in raw, high-speed information while the Secretariat's traditional "line officer" function is directed toward processed products, largely in the form of staff studies prepared by the bureaus for the "command echelon" and the White House.

The support the Operations Center renders to the "command echelon" and the bureaus is not purely technical. The Operations Center is staffed by Foreign Service officers with broad substantive experience. These officers are able to apply this experience in rendering services to decision-makers; in fact many of the services they perform, especially during off-duty hours and in time of emergency, are not unlike those performed by country desk officers.

For example, on one occasion, in the middle of the night, the Senior Watch Officer took the initiative of relaying a request for support for our position at an international meeting the next morning to a foreign chief of state aboard an aircraft in mid-ocean. The result was that the chief of state in question was able to instruct his delegation to support our position before the final vote was taken.

THE Operations Center's role in facilitating rapid US reactions was dramatically illustrated during a crisis over the detention of an American convoy on the Berlin autobahn. Immediate alerting on information concerning the detention received in the Department just before Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called on the Secretary, and quick use of the Center's tele-

William B. Connett, Jr., is the former Director of the Operations Center and is now with the Board of Examiners.

phone facilities to obtain verification of certain facts from Berlin, enabled the Secretary to take the critical development into account in his conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

The heart of the Operations Center is the watch function. The watch operates round the clock, seven days a week. Each watch team consists of a Senior Watch Officer (FSO-3), a military Representative (Lt. Col/Cdr.), an Associate Watch Officer (FSO-6/7), an Editor (FSO-6/7), and a clerk (GS-5). The watch shifts run from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., to 1:00 a.m., and from 1:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.

Among the most important functions of the Watch is that of alerting substantive officers to important developments in their areas of responsibility. This involves making a judgment as to the importance and urgency of a particular piece of information, whether received by telegram, wire service "ticker," or telephone, or otherwise. Such a judgment involves both whether to alert and whom to alert. It may also involve correlating one piece of information with other pieces, or if the initial report is incomplete, seeking supplementary data from the intelligence community or elsewhere.

SOMETIMES a Watch Officer will alert on a telegram of routine precedence, in the knowledge that it bears importantly on the subject matter of an imminent policy conference. Conversely, Watch Officers will sometimes refrain from awakening an officer at night to alert him to a telegram bearing an **IMMEDIATE** precedence designator, having determined that the information has been overtaken by events.

An important asset in the alerting process has resulted from the

installation some months ago of teletype repeaters in the Operations Center. All telegrams, including those in the AID series, bearing precedence designators of **IMMEDIATE** or **FLASH** are sent electrically to the Operations Center by the Telecommunications Operations Division (OC/T) immediately they are received in the Department. In time of emergency all telegrams bearing on the area of crisis are sent electrically to the Operations Center. These teletype repeaters have greatly speeded up the alerting process and provided the means of furnishing action officers with advance teletype copies of telegrams substantially sooner than the copies of record can be processed, reproduced and distributed.

To carry out their alerting responsibilities, Watch Officers must be able to get in touch with responsible officers of the State Department at any time of day or night. The Operations Center therefore maintains a locator board indicating where a dozen or so key officers of the Department can be reached at all times; and it also prepares, distributes and keeps current a weekly whereabouts list of about 150 principal officials and duty officers of the Department. This list serves not only the Operations Center but also the Department telephone operators and duty officers of other divisions of the Department.


Related to the alerting function is the briefing function. Watch Officers must be prepared, at any time, to brief senior officers, including the Secretary, on important developments throughout the world. Sometimes such officers will call personally at the Operations Center to receive the latest information on a particular situation. At other times they will telephone the Watch for this purpose. This means that the Watch Officers must al-

ways have the latest information at their fingertips; they do not have time for research when they are asked for a quick run-down on a current problem.

A more formal manifestation of the Operations Center's briefing function lies in writing and editing various summaries. Some of these, like the morning **TOP SECRET Staff Summary**, are written and edited in the Operations Center. Others, like the Principal Officer's Daily Summary and the weekly Current Foreign Relations, are put together and edited in the Operations Center from contributions furnished by the bureau Policy Reports Officers. They all, however, form part of the Secretariat's and Operations Center's central function of disseminating information, in as assimilable a form as possible, to policymaking officers.

ANOTHER major function of the Operations Center Watch is the maintenance of liaison with other agencies active in the field of national security operations. Liaison with the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the White House and CIA situation rooms is particularly close. At all hours of the day and night information is exchanged among these centers which are interconnected by special "hot lines" and secure telephones. This liaison is complemented by that maintained by INR with the intelligence community. The Operations Center and INR work closely together to assure, among other things, that operational and intelligence information is properly and promptly correlated.

Last September an important step was taken towards strengthening liaison as it applies to what Senator Jackson once called "The Central Partnership: State and Defense." In that month arrangements



IN THE MAP ROOM—The Director of the Operations Center, Lewis Hoffacker (center left), conducts a staff meeting. At the conference table from left to right are Lt. Col. Edsel Hart, Ralph Co-

deux, James Fazio, Philip Axelrod, Miss Gerry Proulx, Mr. Hoffacker, Grant Hilliker, S/S; Mrs. Marie Connolly, Taduo Kobayashi, Robert B. Williams, John T. Vanderveen, and Miss Marilyn Morgan.

were agreed upon for an exchange of officers between the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the State Department's Operations Center. These arrangements provide for round-the-clock presence of State Department representatives in the NMCC. Three Foreign Service officers—John Rieger, FSO-3, Douglas O'Connell, FSO-3, and Andrew Kauffman, FSO-4—are already assigned to watches at the NMCC. Two more officers are in the process of being assigned there. The status of the military representatives in the Operations Center is the same, i.e., three officers—Lt. Col. Edsel Hart, USA; Lt. Col. Steve Marcinko, USAF, and Maj. George Day, USA—are on board and two more are expected shortly.

While the functions performed by these exchange officers are so varied as to be difficult to describe within the space allotted here, they can be summed up under the principal headings of improving inter-agency coordination and providing specialized advice. Experience has already demonstrated that these exchanges can perform many useful services, even in times of relative calm. In time of crisis, of course, their services are at a premium. Indeed, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when Operations Center officers were temporarily assigned round-the-clock to the NMCC, first demonstrated the usefulness of this kind of arrangement and provided the impetus for making it permanent and reciprocal. One of the great advantages of the permanent arrangement is that the exchanges become intimately familiar with the operations of the receiving agency and the environment in which they work. In periods of crisis, one cannot afford to grope around in a new element!

IF it is important that the officers who work in situation rooms and command centers be familiar with the environment in which they work, it is equally important that this environment provide the physical facilities to permit them to do the job they are supposed to do. Since the time it was first established in 1961, the Operations Center has gradually improved its physical plant. A series of rewiring and remodelling projects, culminating in some major construction last spring, have provided rationalized telephone communications and functionally designed space for special purpose communications.

The watch area has been provided with, among other things, a large T-shaped desk arrangement designed and constructed by Visual Services. Four special telephone consoles have been built into this desk. On these consoles appear all the Operations Center telephone circuits, including various "hot lines" and special purpose circuits such as the Inter-American Telephone Network. Also on these consoles are the "drops" for a telephone referral system whereby senior officers can have incoming calls switched automatically to the Operations Center after they have gone home.

A sound-proof teleconferencing room has been added to provide a locale for conducting secure emergency teletype conversations with overseas posts.

THE teleconference room and another room adjacent to the watch area are designed also to provide working space for bureau officers and others stationed in the Operations Center in times of emergency. Procedures approved by the Secretary call for the presence in the Operations Center of substantive officers from the bureaus in time of crisis. These arrangements enable the bureaus to monitor the crisis round-the-clock. They also permit them to take advantage of the special services the Operations Center offers, including rapid communications, inter-agency liaison, military advice, visual displays, sleeping accommodations and in general, the back-up provided by Operations Center officers who combine substantive experience with knowledge of the techniques of "crisis management."

Thus far this year the procedures for having round-the-clock bureau representation in the Operations Center have been invoked in such problem areas as Berlin, Panama, Brazil, Cyprus, Laos, Viet-Nam and East Africa. The level of bureau representation has varied according to the gravity of the crisis, but in most cases Assistant Secretaries have spent some time in the Operations Center while the crisis was at its height. Indeed the Secretary himself has dropped in to the Operations Center during many of these critical periods to receive the latest information and consult with bureau and Operations Center officers.

These arrangements were placed in effect, for example, after word was received late one evening of a coup in one of the unstable areas of the world. The Senior

Watch Officer promptly alerted officers of the geographic bureau and Department officials concerned with emergency and evacuation planning, arranged for electrical relay of all reports on the developing situation to the Operations Center and other agencies concerned with national security, and obtained information on American citizens in the country. That same night a group of officers was established at the Operations Center to deal with the emergency and, following coordination with the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, authorization was obtained for a US naval vessel to proceed to the area for possible evacuation of American citizens.

In the ensuing forty-eight hours about one hundred telegrams were received at the Operations Center on the crisis and were in the hands of action officers within moments after receipt in the Department. The responsible Office Director and others from the bureau were in the Operations Center almost without interruption, day and night, for the duration of the acute phase of the crisis, consulting interested posts by telephone, evaluating all available information and working out recommendations for courses of action to deal with the crisis.

ARRANGEMENTS such as those just described are invoked to deal with sudden or temporary crises. They are to be distinguished from the more formal type of organization, such as the Berlin and South Viet-Nam task forces and the Cuban Coordinator's Office, which have been set up to deal with certain long-festering problems. On the other hand, the procedures for dealing with sudden emergencies or incidents requiring quick reaction can, of course, be applied to deal with critical peaks in longer run problem areas for which inter-departmental task forces have been established.

The increasing use which the bureaus have been making of the Operations Center, not only in times of crisis but in "normal" times as well, is a measure of the improvement in the services and facilities it has to offer. It is also indicative of the growing awareness throughout the State Department of the importance of being able to react quickly and effectively, in concert with other agencies, in a world whose dimensions of time and space have been vastly shrunk.

REGISTER AND VOTE

The Department of State

